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Blue Sensors: 
Technology and Cooperative Monitoring 
in UN Peacekeeping 
Abstract 
For over a half-century, the soldiers and civilians deployed to conflict areas in UN peacekeeping 
operations have monitored ceasefires and peace agreements of many types with varying degrees 
of effectiveness. Though there has been a significant evolution of peacekeeping, especially in 
the 1990s, with many new monitoring functions, the UN has yet to incorporate monitoring 
technologies into its operations in a systematic fashion. Rather, the level of technology depends 
largely on the contributing nations and the individual field commanders. In most missions, 
sensor technology has not been used at all. So the UN has not been able to fully benefit from the 
sensor technology revolution that has seen effectiveness greatly amplified and costs plummet. 
This paper argues that monitoring technologies need not replace the human factor, which is 
essential for confidence building in conflict areas, but they can make peacekeepers more 
effective, more knowledgeable and safer. Airborne, ground and underground sensors can allow 
peacekeepers to do better monitoring over larger areas, in rugged terrain, at night (when most 
infractions occur) and in adverse weather conditions. Technology also allows new ways to share 
gathered information with the parties to create confidence and, hence, better pre-conditions for 
peace. In the future sensors should become “tools of the trade” to help the UN keep the peace in 
war-torn areas. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
See Appendix 1 for abbreviations of individual UN peacekeeping operations. 
CMC 
CP 
GPR 
GPS 
IR 
MAC 
NATO 
NVE 
OP 
PKO 
SOFA 
SOMA 
TCN 
UAV 
UN 
UNEF 
UNMO 
UNPA 
UNTSO 
UPS 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 
Checkpoint 
Ground penetrating radar 
Global Positioning System 
Infrared 
Mixed Armistice Commission 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Night vision equipment 
Observation posts 
Peacekeeping operation 
Status of Forces Agreement 
Status of Mission Agreement 
troop-contributing nation 
Unmanned aerial vehicle 
United Nations 
United Nations Emergency Force 
United Nations military observer 
United Nations Protected Area 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
Uninterruptible power supply 
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1. Introduction 
No other organization has as much experience monitoring peace agreements as the United 
Nations. For over a half-century, the UN has played the role of primary third-party verifier of 
agreements between a wide range of conflicting parties around the world: colonial powers and 
independence-seeking groups; “communist” and “capitalist” forces (usually armed groups who 
fought proxy wars with superpower support during the Cold War); warring states in the Middle 
East; rebel groups and governments in Central America and the former Soviet Union; armed 
factions in South East Asia after periods of genocide (e.g., Cambodia and East Timor); 
governments and ethnic groups in Africa, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia; even superpowers 
seeking international confirmation of troop withdrawals (e.g., US withdrawal from the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-89), and others. 
The UN calls the missions that it sends to the field with a military component to monitor and 
help maintain the peace, peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The UN definition of peacekeeping 
has changed several times, but a recent definition is entirely adequate’: 
Peacekeeping is the deployment of international (UN) military and civilian 
personnel to a conflict area, with the consent of the parties to the conflict, 
in order to: 
- stop or contain hostilities or 
- supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement. 
The UN peacekeepers, sometimes called “Blue Helmets,” “Blue Berets,” and even “Blue Caps” 
(civilian peacekeepers) because of the color of their headgear, have had to monitor a great range 
of areas and activities: from disputed borders to entire countries; from cease-fires to combatant 
disarmament and demobilization programs; from human rights violations to national elections. 
These soldiers and civilians have served as early warners of war, investigators of complaints, 
judges of compliance and witnesses to raging conflicts. They have also been called upon to 
intervene forcefidly to try to stop the buildup of tensions and the escalation of violence. 
UN peacekeeping has evolved considerably over time. The mandates became more complex and 
the monitoring tasks became more elaborate. Conflicting parties gave more access, more 
responsibilities and, on paper at least, pledged more cooperation to the UN. In particular, the 
types and number of missions jumped significantly after the Cold War. In the 1990s, for 
instance, the number of new missions was double the number of the previous forty years. The 
map in Figure 1 shows the locations of UN peacekeeping operations, both completed and on- 
going (bold print). Descriptions of the UN operations are provided in Appendix 1, including the 
monitoring and other mandates. This paper explores the evolution of these functions, how the 
concept of cooperative monitoring was applied in peacekeeping and the use of technology to 
assist with the wide range of monitoring tasks. 
This definition of peacekeeping was taken from the UN web site (www.un.ora/Depts/dpko, accessed 1 
February 1999). 
9 
Monitoring technologies were included to a much greater degree in the later missions, facilitated 
by the fact that technology was increasing in effectiveness while decreasing in cost. The use of 
technology, however, was and is nowhere near its potential and the subject is just beginning to be 
explored in the literature (see Bibliography) and in the field by the UN. Some scenarios for using 
sensors are suggested in this paper. 
- 
COMPLETED AND ONGOING PEACEKEEPUW MlSSlONS 
I 
f 
.- 
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I 
Figure 1. WorIdmap of Wpeacekeeping operations, completed and ongoing @old) 
(Descriptions of all the missions deployed up to 2003 are given in Appendix 1.) 
of March 1999 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
'a 
a 
'a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
e 
' 0  
a 
* a  
a 
a 
a 
10 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a- 
a 
a* 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a *  
a 
a *  
a 
a 
0 
0 
e 
1.1. The Evolution of Peacekeeping 
UN OBSERVERS. Their beat-no man’s land. Their job-to get the facts straight. 
A frontier incident, an outbreak of fighting . . . Which nation is responsible, whose 
story is true? The UN must know. So its peace patrols keep vigil to prevent flare- 
ups, supervise truces, investigate and report. Already this vital work has helped to 
end bloodshed, bringing a promise of peace to millions of people. 
- UN Department of Public Information poster, c. 1 9602 
UN peacekeeping can logically be divided into four broad functional categories 
corresponding roughly to “generations” of operations covering its 50-odd year hi~tory.~ Each 
new category brings new tasks and monitoring requirements. The oldest type is the “observer 
mission,” characterized by the quotation cited above. In this type of operation, the main purpose 
is to observe the deployments and activities of the armed forces of two or more conflicting states, 
usually in relation to a cease-fire agreement negotiated by the states, often with UN meditation. 
Sometimes the operation’s title and mandate included the ambitious term “supervision” but 
conditions rarely put these UN operations in such an elevated position over the parties. The 
unarmed observers on the ground, however, have had many opportunities to help de-escalate or 
contain violence. In addition to the “observe and report” function, they often attempt to 
influence parties to quell violence using advice, aid and mediati~n.~ The UN’s first official 
peacekeeping operation (still operating), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO), provides excellent examples of how monitoring is used in basic peacekeeping, as we 
shall see. A list of observer missions is provided in Appendix 1, Table 1. 
The second type of operation was initiated in 1956 when a “UN force’’ was deployed to the Sinai 
to separate the Egyptian army from the invading forces of Israel, France and the United 
Kingdom, thus ending the Suez crisis. In second-generation operations, UN troops are interposed 
between conflicting armed forces. These forces typically number in the thousands, while 
observer missions usually number in the hundreds. Unlike soldiers in observer missions, the 
peacekeepers in these “second-generation” operations are armed, and they are deployed in 
preformed units (e.g., battalions). By separating combatants such forces reduce the number of 
military contacts and flare ups and allow more effective monitoring of the tense zones between 
the parties. To prevent parties from violating a cease-fire or gaining new ground, the UN must 
keep constant watch over the positions of combatants on the ground. The peacekeepers must 
Presentation 2235, lE, UN Audiovisual Unit, New York. 
It is common in the peacekeeping literature to talk about only two categories or generations: traditional 
2 
3 
peacekeeping and second generation peacekeeping. This breakdown ignores the fact that “traditional” 
peacekeeping is itself divided into the categories of observer missions (first used in 1946) and 
interpositioning missions (first used in 1956). In the 1990s, the range of functions increased dramatically. 
At the end of the decade another jump was made, with some new missions actually governing territories 
during a transitional period. Hence the concept of four generations of peacekeeping is more precise. 
In all generations of peacekeeping operations, the UN tries to prevent or reduce fighting through 
negotiation, mediation and the exercise of its “good offices” but it can only succeed to the extent that the 
parties allow. 
4 
11 
anticipate any forward movements of military forces from agreed positions and sometimes seek 
to place themselves in the way of any such advances. 
In his pioneering report to the General Assembly on the proposed United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) in 1956, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold set out the basic principles that 
have guided this type of “traditional” peacekeeping ~peration.~ The Force was to be: 
Under the command of the Secretary-General (as the earlier missions had 
become) 
Recruited from Member States other than the permanent members of the 
Security Council (i.e., China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 
and the United States were excluded from direct, on-the-ground participation 
due to their Cold War strategic involvement in most disputes in the world); 
Paid for by the United Nations, except for the salaries of troops, which would 
continue to be covered by the contributing states; 
Impartial, i.e., the forces would not seek to influence the military balance, and 
Non-combatant, using force only in self-defense. 
Hammarskjold negotiated an agreement with the host state, Egypt,6 that was to become a model 
for future Status of the Force Agreements (SOFAS), covering a wide range of concerns and 
issues, including the freedom of movement and legal immunity of the UN peacekeepers. Almost 
all first and second generation operations required and received invitations from the host state 
and they could be withdrawn upon request of the host (as was the case when Egypt requested the 
withdrawal of UNEF in 1967). So the operations are of limited value once the parties are 
determined to engage in serious fighting.7 
The third generation of UN operations arose from the changed character of the majority of 
conflicts since the end of the Cold War, as generalized in Table 1. The UN became more 
involved in internal conflicts, which had increased in intensity as well as number. The UN 
sought to bring a lasting harmony between warring factions, not just a cease-fire, and to assist in 
the difficult task of nation building. This required “multidimensional” peacekeeping, 
encompassing a wide range of functions and methods, from traditional observation of armed 
forces to the delivery of humanitarian aid to human rights promotion and the supervision of 
elections. While the previous two “generations” monitored mainly military activities, the new 
missions have had to monitor additional categories of activity: political, humanitarian, police, 
judicial, electoral, economic and human rights. The UN had to keep track not only of military 
Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. AI3289 of 4 November 1956. 
David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, stated in parliament that “on no account will Israel 
agree to the stationing of foreign forces, no matter how called, in her territory, or in any of the areas 
occupied by her.” (Blue Helmets, United Nations, New York, third ed., 1996, p.45) While UNEF was not 
stationed on Israel, UNTSO continued to operate there (with its headquarters still in Jerusalem) and 
UNIFIL later worked in areas occupied by Israel in Lebanon. 
The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) which occupied territory on both 
nations is an exception. The Security Council created the mission under Chapter VI1 and, under 
international law, it cannot be withdrawn without the authorization of the Council, even if the states @e., 
Iraq or Kuwait) demand its removal. Some other missions (e.g., in Somalia) have had similarly strong 
mandates. 
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a 
forces, but also try to reform the security sector such as a whole, since unreformed agencies 
posed a threat to the peace process. This meant training new border guards, prosecutors and 
judges, and in some instances tacking the difficult issue of the reform of intelligence agencies. 
The task further expanded in some missions to include the supervision of certain departments of 
the government (defence and foreign affairs), fighting crime, controlling cross-border smuggling 
and enforcing UN sanctions. Major powers, including permanent members of the Security 
Council (the P5), now actively participated in “third generation” operations. Though such 
operations are usually considered a phenomenon of the end of the Cold War, a forerunner 
operation was staged in the early 1960s in the Congo. Since 1989, when the pioneering operation 
in Namibia was deployed, over twenty operations have been launched that could be classified 
under the multidimensional heading. 
Cold War 
Intentate, inter-alliance 
Table 1. From Cold War to Hot Wars: dgerent conflicts and different peacekeeping, reflecting the 
changed focus of the international community 
Post-Cold War 
Intrastate, internal 
Soldiers (non-P5) ~ 
I 
Power bloc rivalry; I Ethnic/tribal/religious animosities, secessionism 
Soldiers, civilian police, civilian monitors 
(elections, human rights); includes P5 (i.e., 
permanent members of the Security Council) 
Ideology 
Armed attackhnvasion 
National/international 
Conflict management: 
security; 
cease-fire and 
withdrawal agreements 
Deterrence, negotiation, 
classical peacekeeping 
State boundaries 
Civil war, human rights violations (including 
genocide, torture), terrorism 
Human security; Conflict resolution: 
comprehensive (multidimensional) peace 
agreements; Conflict prevention 
Cooperation, mediation, modern peacekeeping 
(classical peacekeeping PLUS humanitarian 
action, disarmament, elections, enforcement, 
sanctions, economic assistance, peacebuilding) 
Throughout a nation or region 
At the end of the 1990s, a new type of operation was created for the purpose of “transitional 
administration.” Here the UN found itself not merely supervising a peace accord but actually 
governing an entire territory during a transitional period. The main cases are the missions in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTAET). While East Timor became self-governing in 
2002, Kosovo is still under UN administration. 
A summary of the purpose and methods of each of the four major categories of operations is 
provided in Table 2. A list of the peacekeeping operations in each generation is presented in 
Appendix 1, illustrating the “alphabet soup’’ of UN acronyms and the main monitoring activities 
13 
of these missions. There have been over sixty operations since the first one was created in 1948.8 
But the vast majority of these (over 40) have been launched since the end of the Cold War.' 
To perform the wide range of monitoring tasks required for all four types of peacekeeping 
operations, the UN has used a host of methods, including observation posts (OPs), checkpoints 
(CPs), foot and vehicle patrols, as well as aerial reconnaissance and occasionally some 
technological means. It has also benefited from information supplied by the parties themselves, 
locals, foreign governments and the media. This paper explores the different levels of 
cooperation that the parties have provided to help the UN in its monitoring tasks and the various 
technological means that the UN has deployed (or could have deployed) to enhance such 
monitoring. 
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), created in 1948, is considered by the 
UN as its first peacekeeping operation, since it came under the control of the UN Secretary-General. 
Earlier missions of the UN, though not under the Secretary-General's control, could also be considered as 
peacekeeping operations, namely the Commissions sent to Greece (1946), Indonesia (1947) and Korea 
(1 947). 
The end of the Cold War is taken to be 1988, when it became clear that the Soviet Union, under 
Michael Gorbachev, was no longer going to continue its participation in it. In February 1988, the Soviet 
Union announced it would start repatriating its troops from Afghanistan with UN verification. There was 
constructive engagement in the UN Security Council on a range of international issues since 1986 and on 
17 September 1987, Gorbachev had made his dramatic proposals for strengthening the United Nations. In 
December 1988, Gorbachev made the announcement of unprecedented cuts in Soviet Armed forces. 
8 
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Table 2. The Evolution of Peacekeeping: The Four Types or “Generations ’’ of UN Operations 
Type of Operation Purpose Means and Methods Original Examples 
Observer Missions To determine if parties are Monitoring through foot UNTSO (194%) in the 
respecting a cease-fire or Middle East was the first 
other peace agreements, observation posts, official mission of this 
and assist in local checkpoints, etc. type; UNMOGIP (1 949-) 
settlements Mostly used UN military in Kashmir followed 
and vehicle patrols, 
observers (UNMOs) shortly thereafter 
Interpositional Forces To prevent or put an end to Placing peacekeeping UNEF (1956-67), 
combat between parties troops, mostly battalions, stationed between Israeli 
and Egyptian forces was 
the first peacekeeping 
between combatants. 
Using patrols, checkpoints 
(fixed or mobile), force 
searches, escort, show of 
UN presence/force 
All of the above, plus 
areas and civilians, storage 
Multidimensional The UN Operation in the 
Operations implementation of a protection of assembly Congo (ONUC, 1960-64) 
was the first of this type; 
Oversee or assist in the 
complex peace agreement 
(which may involve and destruction of UNTAG (1989-90) in 
disarmament, surrendered weapons, Namibia pioneered this 
demobilization and escorts and protection of m e  of mission in modern 
reintegration of former key personneYfacilities, times; UNTAC (1992-93) 
combatants, humanitarian oversight of police forces in Cambodia saw a large 
assistance, electoral and other parts of the increase in UN roles and 
assistance, human rights, security sector, etc. Uses responsibilities 
civilian police, mine military, civilian police 
clearance, etc.) and civilian peacekeepers. 
Protection of vulnerable Humanitarian aid convoys, UNPROFOR (1 992-95) 
populations road clearing, evacuation had responsibility for “UN 
plans for vulnerable 
persons, securing sites and 
territory. Uses military 
forces and civilian police, 
humanitarian workers, etc. 
Protected Areas” in its 
mandate; these missions 
work in close cooperation 
with humanitarian 
agencies (e.g., UNHCR) 
Transitional Govern a territory during a Comprehensive missions UNMIK (1999-) in 
Administrations transition to independence covering all aspects of Kosovo and 
and self-governance society (from military and UNTAET (1999-2002) are 
legal to education and 
sanitation). Uses soldiers, 
police and administrators 
main examples. Earlier 
 TEA (1962-63) in 
West New Guinea 
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2. Cooperative Monitoring and UN Peacekeeping 
Observers and observation groups are an essential part of any peacekeeping 
machinery which the United Nations is likely to set up. However, their 
effectiveness will depend on the cooperation received from the country in which 
they are observing. If the host country cooperates by giving them reasonably 
correct and full information, and allows them to go where they must in order to 
ascertain the true situation, then the task of the observer is relatively easy. 
Unfortunately, such cooperation on the part of the host countries has seldom been 
experienced by UNTSO. 
- General E.L.M. Burns, commander of the UN Truce Supervision 
Organization, 1 954-561° 
The term “cooperative monitoring,” coined by the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC), was 
initially applied to arms control, but it can be applied to almost any kind of issue between 
disputants. Certainly, UN peacekeeping is a relevant application. The UN has been 
experimenting with cooperative monitoring with varying success for over a half century. 
As defined by the CMC, cooperative monitoring refers to a “process of gathering and sharing 
agreed information among the parties to an agreement.” This process has four major 
characteristics. First, it uses sharable technologies and methods for gathering information. 
Second, all parties have equal access to the gathered information. Third, cooperative monitoring 
includes mechanisms for securing and validating the information. Fourth, it stipulates 
procedures for dealing with anomalies. 
While monitoring as used in UN peacekeeping operations differs from cooperative monitoring 
strictly defined, it shares many of these characteristics. At a minimum, cooperation in UN 
peacekeeping means having the consent of the parties to the physical presence of UN observers. 
The UN has almost always obtained the consent of the host state for the deployment of its 
personnel.” Furthermore, the UN usually seeks an undertaking, often written into a Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA), from the host state and other parties to give the peacekeepers 
complete freedom of movement in order to carry out their monitoring tasks and other functions. 
However, theory and practice have often been at odds. Beyond initial consent, cooperation with 
the UN has varied across the board. 
In practice, conflicting parties frequently fail to live up to their undertakings under peace 
agreements. Party leaders or local officials have often balked at the full implementation of their 
commitments to assist UN monitoring, especially when it comes to sensitive undertakings that 
lo Bums, E.L.M., Between Arab and Israeli, Clarke, Irwin and Co., Toronto, 1962, p. 277. General Burns 
goes on to describe his monitoring difficulties in UNTSO: “The narrative has shown how both sides 
restricted the observers’ movements from time to time, especially when they thought that their “military 
security” would be prejudiced-that is, when the had something to hide, either offensive preparations or 
some infraction of the terms of the GAA [General Armistice Agreements], such as having troops or 
defensive works in zone where none should have been.” 
Even the host nation’s consent to the presence of UN personnel can be conditional and tentative, as 
shown by the Iraqi acceptance and rejection of inspectors from the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). 
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would make a difference politically or militarily. Sometimes these officials insist that 
observation is permitted for a limited time only, in limited areas, or is conditional on the 
behavior of the opposing party or on the provision of aid from the UN. In missions like 
UNPROFOR (1991-95) in the former Yugoslavia, the UN was not permitted to monitor many 
militarily activities or visit strategic areas considered off limits by the parties. Armed 
combatants at checkpoints prevented UN peacekeepers from entering strategically sensitive 
areas, particularly ones in which there was fighting or preparation for such. They were also not 
permitted to take photos of sensitive sites. In most operations, however, an intermediate degree 
of cooperation and access is provided, though this may not be sufficient to completely fulfill the 
UN mission mandate. Full cooperation was forthcoming in a few missions (e.g., from Soviet 
forces during their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-89 though not from the opposing 
AfghadPakistani side). Despite such hindrance, in almost all missions the UN was able to make 
a constructive contribution to peace with whatever means and freedoms it was able to obtain. 
The experience of UN peacekeeping has shown that cooperation between parties and the UN is, 
in practice, a wide spectrum, a sliding scale, and not two discrete states (on or off). The degree of 
cooperation is closely paralleled by the degree of access that the UN is given by the parties. 
Examples of the various degrees of cooperation and access are given in Table 3. There were 
times in UN history where it found itself in each of these positions, from maximum to minimum. 
Table 3. Various Levels of Cooperation and Access Provided to Peacekeepers 
TASK MAXIMAL INTERMEDIATE MINIMAL 
Deployment of UN All privileges and UN to act strictly within its Consent only for the 
personnel immunities 
guaranteed; free 
use of local 
facilities 
Freedom of Complete freedom 
movement guaranteed 
Picturelvideo taking Anywhere, anytime 
Access inside All rooms 
buildings 
Access to documents All documents, 
and files filing cabinets and 
UN sensors Any resolution, any 
computers 
location, real time 
transmission 
Observation Posts Anywhere, 
anytime, without 
mandate; host has veto over 
presence of certain contingents or 
individuals; moderate charges for 
local amenities 
Escort required; restricted in 
certain areas; prohibited in others; 
UN searched at checkpoints 
Authorized UN individuals only; 
authorization required for each 
site; certain sites (military) 
prohibited 
Advance notice required 
Relevant documents only (on 
“need to know” basis as 
determined by host); 
Medium resolution (e.g., 
sufficient to count but not identify 
individuals); certain instruments 
only at agreed upon (known) 
locations 
Authorized locations only on a 
temporary basis 
establishment of certain bases 
and the deployment of 
authorized units; large charges 
for use of facilities 
Ground and aerial observation 
only in host’s vehicles or 
aircraft; carehlly controlled 
and frequently denied access 
Within or from UN sites or 
observation posts only; 
Prohibited under any other 
circumstance 
Prohibited unless specifically 
invited (with authorization at a 
high level) 
Not permitted; only officially 
published documents may be 
sought 
Not permitted, including 
personal cameras 
Not permitted 
right of refusal 
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Checkpoints Set up anywhere, Agreed locations only; limited Only for counting purposes 
anytime search ability (e.g., not inside 
vehicles); UN prohibited from 
turning back vehicles 
UN communications Complete freedom Encryption not permitted Transmission must be in the 
of transmission and clear; use of host’s facilities 
encryption only 
Information Any information Agreed upon categories of Only information strictly 
provided upon request; information only; only related to the verification 
information on information relevant to mandate; no info. transmitted to 
internal activities complaints issued other party without permission 
Complaints Made to Made promptly Complaints made with no No complaints made by party; 
UN with extensive supporting documentation or no response to complaints 
supporting evidence against party; no access to 
documentation witnesses 
(e.g., photos, 
witness’ reports, 
Though the UN’s use of technology over the decades has been minimal, its basic methods of 
operation have been transparent to the parties in almost all cases.I2 On the second characteristic 
of cooperative monitoring (equal access to the results), however, experience is quite varied. 
Parties do not necessarily receive identical sets of information from the UN, but the world 
organization does try to uphold a standard of impartiality so each side is treated equally 
according to established rules. Furthermore, access to the “results” does not necessarily mean 
access to all information gathered by the UN. The emphasis in UN missions has been on 
providing regular reports to UN headquarters but the missions rarely try to hide their conclusions 
or methods from the parties, especially since the official mission reports of the Secretary-General 
are almost always UN documents with unrestricted circulation. 
In the field, a standard UN practice has been to protest an observed violation to the party 
committing the violation, without necessarily notifying the other side(s), who might otherwise 
become alarmed or use the information for propaganda or hostile purposes. However, when one 
party complains about atrocities to the UN about the other parties, the report of the resulting UN 
investigation would normally be shared with all parties. In addition, parties have access to most 
of the reports of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in the field and the activities of the 
UN mission, as presented to the Security Council in formal, public  document^.'^ 
At times the UN has used subtler methods for gathering information. A case study was published by 
Dorn, A.W. and Bell, J.H., “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-64.” 
For a broader discussion of the overlap of monitoring and intelligence-gathering, see Dorn, A. Walter, 
“The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The Limits of Intelligence-Gathering in UN Peacekeeping”, Pearson 
Paper, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia, 1999.) 
l3 In recent years, the Security Council has increasingly conducted its business behind closed doors in 
private consultations outside the regular Security Council chamber. However, non-members have often 
claimed their right under Article 31 of the Charter to “participate, without vote, in the discussion of any 
question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter consider that the interests of that 
Member are specially affected.” The Security Council has, however, not always granted permission for 
parties to attend its private sessions and the minutes of these meetings, in which the Secretary-General or 
his representative often describe field situations, are not public. 
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If and when the parties agree to establish a common forum to discuss compliance issues 
regarding their agreement (e.g., a cease-fire or peace agreement), it gives the UN a place to raise, 
and hopefully resolve the compliance problems it detects. Otherwise, the UN might hold ad hoc 
meetings with the parties, either together or separately, after an incident. This meets the fourth 
and final requirement for cooperative monitoring as stipulated by the CMC ("procedures for 
dealing with anomalies"). 
2.1. Joint Commissions 
In about half of the UN peacekeeping missions, joint commissions or similar bodies were set up 
to discuss monitoring and compliance issues with the parties. For instance, the 1948 armistice 
agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors created Mixed Armistice Commissions 
(MACs), chaired by an UNTSO official, where parties could lodge and discuss complaints. 
Similar bodies were established in Namibia (1 989), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1 992) and 
Tajikistan (1994). If formal bodies were not created, the UN tried to sponsor or encourage joint 
meetings of the parties (as was the case in the Soviet-Afghan conflict) as a forum to present its 
reports and to discuss alleged violations and other issues of concern. In some cases, such 
meetings also served as negotiating fora to develop future accords, especially if a peace 
agreement had not yet been reached. In some conflicts, however, the parties refused even to meet 
face-to-face (e.g., in the Iran-Iraq conflict). Then the UN officials would have to deal with each 
party separately and often engage in shuttle diplomacy, moving between rooms, buildings or 
even cities (e.g., capitals) to help bring the parties closer to agreement. 
A common forum is invaluable to share information, to promote dialogue, to remove 
misunderstandings and to resolve anomalies. Such bodies help the parties understand each other 
and their respective actions, positions and policies. It also helps the UN iron out difficulties in 
the functioning of the monitoring system. 
2.2. The Benefits of Cooperative Monitoring in Peacekeeping 
Once a cooperative monitoring system has been set up in a mission, how does it help to promote 
peace? It can: 
Build confidence among parties if few or only minor violations are shown to be taking 
place 
Reduce false accusations and propaganda from the conflicting parties 
Alert parties if actual violations are taking place 
Provide a basis for the peacekeepers to deal with violations 
Keep the UN in New York informed of the situation in the field. 
It is not, however, usually sufficient to simply monitor a conflict. To effectively keep the peace, 
there must be a mechanism for the UN to react once a problem has been identified. This is 
particularly important when the problem is likely to lead to an escalation of conflict. The UN has 
a variety of means of influence, from moral suasion to diplomatic pressure to military 
enforcement and a range of incentives (e.g., aid and trade) and disincentives (e.g., sanctions and 
isolation). 
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An example of the UN’s capacity to de-escalate a conflict was provided by UNTSO. In July 
1955, the Jordanian army rushed troops to reinforce its positions on the West Bank after hearing 
reports of a possible Israeli attack on Jerusalem. The UNTSO head, General E.L.M. Bums, 
sought out Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir to discuss this “war scare.” Mrs. Meir was able to 
reassure him that there was no concentration of Israeli troops in the Jerusalem sector, confirming 
the information that Bums had received from his own UN military observers. He then conveyed 
the Israeli assurances to the commander of the Jordanian army in Amman. The commander 
agreed to withdraw his reinforcements on condition that further inspections by UN military 
observers (UNMOs) confirm the Israeli assertion. Apparently, the false alarm was sounded by 
apprehensive Jordanian agents who merely watched traffic on certain roads into Jerusalem. It 
was easy for UNMOs to disprove the allegations through careful counts and surveys. In the end 
the Jordanian forces were withdrawn, something confirmed by UNMOs, thus bringing the 
immediate threat of escalation to an end.I4 
This is but one of the thousands of ways, subtle and direct, that the UN has used monitoring to 
help keep the peace through its field missions. Most of the UN’s experience has involved visual 
observation by UN officials on site. However, technology has increasingly been used to assist the 
UN in its field monitoring duties, especially as it has become cheaper and more effective. Still 
the scope for UN applications is far greater than the present usage suggests. 
l4  Bums, p. 157. 
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3. Blue Sensors: Monitoring Using Technology 
Too often UN peacekeepers find themselves reacting to tragic events after they have occurred 
rather than acting to prevent or even mitigate them. Investigations are usually conducted after 
violations are committed and the results of an atrocity are plain for all to see. Even then, the UN 
often faces the difficult challenge of determining who is responsible. Who fired the first shot? 
Who crossed the cease-fire line first? Who violated the peace agreement? Guilty parties usually 
try to obfuscate the facts to avoid accepting blame. Conflicting stories, propaganda and rumor 
among the conflicting parties are the norm. Thus, there is a great need for independent sources of 
information. 
Because violations could take place anywhere or any time in areas of confi-ontation, it is 
important that the UN possess an effective system for monitoring over large areas. A proactive 
approach to monitoring is needed by the UN because: 
For prevention of violence, early warning is essential; 
For any investigation of violations, objective and independent information is needed; 
For deterrence against violations, a sound monitoring system is required since only then 
will parties fear getting caught or blamed; and 
For confidence-building, an effective system will ensure that the parties get information 
rapidly that they consider vital for their security. 
Technology offers the UN an ever-increasing set of tools to meet the demanding tasks of 
monitoring. Just as technology has revolutionized war-fighting, it has the potential to do the 
same for peacekeeping. Unfortunately, the literature on technology for peacekeeping is miniscule 
and only in its infancy. Compared to the thousands of books on technology for war-fighting, 
there is only one book devoted to technology for peacekeeping (see the Bibliography). This 
section seeks to contribute to the exploration of technology uses in peacekeeping. 
Using technology, the UN would be better able to acquire the information it needs for a proactive 
stance and effective reporting, both to UN headquarters and to the parties. Specifically, 
technologies offer the following benefits. They can: 
Increase the range and accuracy of observation 
Permit continuous monitoring (e.g., 24-hour radar) 
Increase effectiveness (incl. cost effectiveness in some circumstances) 
Decrease intrusiveness (since human bodies need not be permanently present at a site) 
Increase UN safe@ (since UN gains more situational awareness, including around the 
UN’s own camps). 
A description of the main monitoring technologies is given in Table 4. The sensors can detect 
various types of signals, including electromagnetic radiation (using either passive or active 
systems), magnetic fields, acoustic waves, or pressurehtrain. In addition, chemical and biological 
sensors can also be important in some missions, for example, in the detection of landmines, 
explosives and even chemical, biological or other toxic agents. 
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TECHNOLOGY QUANTITY MEASURED EXAMPLES OF USE a 
Table 4. Monitoring technologies for peacekeeping 
Electromagnetic Sensing (Passive) 
Visible light imaging (using film or Photograph or video troops, tanks, 
charge-coupled device (CCD)) vehicles in a demilitarized zone 
Infrared (IR) imaging (i.e., heat sensing) Locate operating vehicles, warm bodies 
Near infrared 0.7-1.4 pm moving across cease-fire lines at night, 
Short wave infrared (SWIR) 1.4-2.0 pm aid to patrols 
Mid wave infrared (MWIR) 
Long wave infrared (LWIR) 
Electromagnetic radiation, emitted or 
reflected, of wavelength . . . 
0.4-0.7 pm 
3.C5.0 pm 
9.0-12.0 pm 
>30 cm (HF: 3-30 MHz; Radiowave monitoring 
Electromagnetic Sensing (Active) 
Receive and monitor radio 
VHF: 30-300 MHz) communications 
Electromagnetic radiation, originating 
from the sensor system and reflected 
by object, in the wavelength range . . . 
LIDAR (LIght Detecting And Ranging) 
RADAR (RAdio Detecting And Ranging) 
0.41.1 pm Determine vehicle speed, location of 
combatant's positions 
Detect person entering monitored zone 
Find buried weapons or mass graves 
Spot weapons and deployments, day 
and night & in all weather conditions 
Detect planes violating no-fly zones 
Identify weapons inside metal or 
wooden cases or beneath clothes of 
person passing through detector 
Detection of mines in fields; vehicles 
Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) 
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) 
Doppler Radar 0.1-100 cm Determine vehicle speed 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 
Aerial Surveillance Radar 
X-Ray detection and imaging 
10-30 cm (X-band: 10 GHz; K-band: 
24 GHz; Ka band: 33-36 GHz) 
2-10 m (30-150 MHz, typically) 
3-50 cm 
3-50 cm (e.g.) 
0.03-3 IUII 
Magnetic (and Quasi-Static Electric 
Acoustic Wave Sensing 
Seismic sensing (long-range) using a 
Seismic detection (short-range) using a 
Sonar (Sound Navigation And Ranging) 
Magnetic field perturbations due to 
Field) Detection large ferromagnetic objects passing on roads 
Elastic waves traveling through 
earth's interior and along its surface 
Elastic waves traveling along Earth's 
Acoustic waves, in water, of 
wavelength 10 cm- 1 km (passive) 
0.1-30 cm (active) 
Sound waves frequency >20 kHz 
Sound waves in air of frequency 
20Hz-20kHz (wavelength 1 cm-20m) 
Pressure (or strain) applied on contact 
with 
a cable (fiber optic or piezoelectric 
Underground explosions (e.g., in 
explosives testing and in mining) 
Detect vehicle or combatant intrusion 
Observe ship passage into restricted 
areas or presence of sea-mines 
Probe artillery shells for chemical 
weapons' agents 
Determine which side/party fired first; 
provide alert if tanks are traveling 
along roads or removed from storage 
seismograph 
geophone surface into restricted areas 
detection 
Ultrasound probing 
Microphone 
Pressure and Strain Sensing 
Strain sensitive cable Detect vehicles moving on monitored 
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Figure 2. Composite diagram showing various sensors that might be employed in apeacekeping 
operation 
The composite diagram in Figure 2 depicts a wide range of practical technologies that can assist 
monitoring in peacekeeping. A regional UN station (bottom right) could receive, gather and 
disseminate data, as well as to dispatch UN interception vehicles to respond rapidly. The top 
portion illustrates the variety of potential aerospace reconnaissance platfoms: helicopters, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), reconnaissance aircraft, AWACS planes (e.g., as used by 
NATO during the UN’s operation in Bosnia), balloons (tethered, guided or ftee floating) and 
satellites. Overhead reconnaissance permits surveillance over large areas that can help spot the 
locations of the armed forces and any illegal movements of troops or weapons, as well as the 
locations of refugees and aid stations. . On the ground, the UN can equip its observation posts 
with powerful binoculars (as it has in the past), and use ground surveillance radar (GSR) to cover 
open ground and waterways, especially to observe movements of forces or materiel across 
borders or into demilitarized or buffer zones. It can deploy video surveillance cameras for remote 
monitoring and use ground penetrating radar (GPR) to look for buried objects (such as weapons) 
and underground bunkers and tunnels. The UN could employ infrared breakbeams and 
seismometers to detect the movements of vehicles or persons, perhaps in conjunction with traffic 
monitoring at a checkpoint or a system of interception patrols. Certain areas which are favorite 
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entrance routes for intruders can be blocked off with taut-wire fences, which not only act as 
barriers but also send signals when touched (or climbed), giving the location of the intrusion. 
The following scenario illustrates how a technologically-advanced cooperative monitoring 
system might provide vital assistance to peacekeepers (“Blue Sensors for Blue Helmets”). 
Consider a buffer zone between two conflicting parties: A and B, for simplicity. The UN places a 
number of sensors in the buffer zone and at its edges. An armed night-time intruder moves from 
side A to the buffer zone to reach side B by vehicle and foot, setting off several sensors. These 
might include a magnetic detectors on roads and seismic detectors on a nearby field. The signals 
are transmitted to a UN field station several kilometers away that is responsible for the sector. 
From the sequence of seismic signals the direction of movement is determined. A pair of UN 
military observers is dispatched from the station in a UN vehicle. They keep in radio contact 
with the station and are informed of the rough movements of the possible intruder. As they 
approach, the sound of the jeep engine alerts the intruder, who scurries into the bush for cover. 
But the UNMOs, equipped with infra-red vision devices, are able to see a warm body against the 
background of foliage. Furthermore, they know that something set off the metal detector though 
the intruder is on foot. This alerts them to the possibility of a weapon. They are able to 
apprehend him with their superior numbers and discover that he is carrying a mortar. The 
intruder is questioned about his weapon, from which it is deduced that he probably intended to 
attack a local garrison that night. The next day, both he and his weapon are returned to the 
authorities in side A, who place him under arrest. The UN observers file a report, which is sent 
to all parties and to UN headquarters. 
Furthermore, in this idealized scenario, the intrusion incident is raised in the next meeting of the 
Joint Commission. Party A explains that the intruder was a renegade soldier who was acting 
without orders. Furthermore, the representative alleges that the soldier is being disciplined. Party 
B insists that the UN follow the case in the military tribunals of side A to see if punishment is 
actually being exacted. The UN agrees to do so. At the next meeting of the Joint Commission a 
month later, the UN described its follow-up along with the sentence. The matter is considered 
closed. What could have been a major international incident, such as an attack on a garrison, is 
now de-fused by the UN through a combination of technologies for early detection, a quick UN 
response, a forum for discussion and a means to verify the implementation of any promises. In 
short, this is an effective cooperative monitoring system. 
Such incidents have occurred in UN peacekeeping operations, though the response of the parties 
is rarely so ideal. The UN’s resources to detect movements are limited, especially at night and 
over large areas. Many opportunities for proactive or even reactive measures were missed 
because the UN could not monitor more thoroughly more territory more of the time. 
The system could be further enhanced with a direct communication lines between New York, the 
mission headquarters and local commanders. These may even be able to contribute to the UN’s 
information, e.g., provide their own alerts to the UN about intruders. “Hot lines” and special 
radio links have, for instance, been established in past UN missions (e.g., in Cambodia and 
Afghanistan). 
. a  
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
‘a 
a 
‘a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
e 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
. a  
a 
. a  
a 
a 24 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a’ 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
e 
The ability to share sensor data with parties can also be greatly facilitated by technology. Data 
links can be established between the UN and the parties to whatever extent is deemed desirable 
and agreed in advance. At a minimum, summary reports can be faxed or e-mailed periodically 
(e.g., weekly). In addition, parties might receive the UN’s reports of its investigations soon after 
they are completed. For maximum feedback, the UN might even share raw data gained by 
sensors with the parties in near real time. Through regular and systematic reporting, the parties 
will gain increased confidence in the UN and the monitoring system. With the prior consent of 
the parties, the results and even the data might be placed on the world wide web for universal 
access. 
3.1. Basic Monitoring Tasks 
The UN has performed a great many monitoring tasks in its history. These have grown in scope 
and complexity with each successive type or generation of peacekeeping. The most frequent 
monitoring objectives are basic to all missions: cease-fires; demilitarized or controlled zones; 
and strategidprotected sites, including the UN’s own facilities. These tasks are regularly found 
in each category of peacekeeping: observation missions, interpositional forces, multi- 
dimensional operations and transitional administrations. The possible technology applications for 
these basic monitoring objectives are described below. 
After a cease-fire (see Figure 3), the parties are usually in close proximity of each other, as 
determined by their last wartime engagement. Sometimes they continue to seek territorial gain by 
moving their forces forward or otherwise violating the cease-fire. Thus, an outside verifier, such 
as the UN, needs to keep a careful watch over the military positions of the two sides. The UN 
can usually patrol along the cease-fire line and often on either side as well, among the opposing 
forces, but such patrols can only cover a small area for a specific amount of time and are 
hampered at night. The cover of night is frequently used by smugglers and violators of peace 
accords. For 24-hour surveillance, technology is usually needed. The use of acoustic sensors can 
be useful to permit the UN to determine which side breaks the cease-fire first. Acoustic devices 
could, for example, be pointed in opposite directions, towards the parties on opposite sides. From 
the timing and nature of the acoustic signals (mortar, artillery or even rifle fire), the UN might be 
able to determine which side is responsible for the initiation of hostilities. 
Parties sometimes deliberately send infiltrators across the cease-fire line to the other side. To 
detect this, the UN can consider using ground surveillance radar, which will detect movement 
over large areas. Ground surveillance radar was used in the UN’s Lebanon mission (UNIFIL) to 
detect intruders along the Litani River dividing line. Roads can be monitored remotely using a 
combination of magnetic, IR breakbeam and pressure sensors. 
Infrared night vision devices have proven extremely useful for night-time observation of forces 
on opposing sides of a cease-fire line. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) provides a useful and interesting example. Swedish peacekeepers had a lookout 
over the positions of both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish sides on opposite sides of the “Green 
Line,” which divided the country. Employing night-vision equipment, they could easily see that 
Turkish soldiers were digging new positions each night in contravention of the cease-fire. This 
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was obvious to the UN but the Turks continued to deny it. The chief Swedish officer cunningly 
2 local commander of the Turkish forces to an evening tea at the UN post. decided tc :-..:L. AT. rn 
I I 
Figure 3. Diagram showing how sensors might be deployed to assist with monitoring a cease-$re. a a 
Q- Legend for Figures 3-4. 
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Figure 4. Diagram showing how monitoring technologies might be deployed in a demilitarizedzone and 
a weapons-exclusion zone 
While there, the Swedish officer asked the Turkish commander if he would like to have a look 
through a night vision device, to which the commander eagerly agreed. To his embarrassment, 
what he saw was his own soldiers undeniably digging in the distance. The activity at the site 
stopped after that night. 
Various types of zones can be monitored, in accordance with an armistice or peace agreement. 
These include: demilitarized zones, where no military personnel or weapons or materiel are 
permitted; limited forces zones, where only designated forces and certain equipment (e.g., 
personal weapons) are permitted; or controlled zones where a range of restrictions may apply. 
The layered approach, incorporating both types of zones, is illustrated in Figure 4. Often these 
zones are created h m  the no-man's land that existed between the combatants at the time of their 
last engagement. In most cases, they are areas of contention each side would like to control. 
Therefore the UN has to keep watch over the tenitoy and move its own forces into areas 
coveted by one or both sides. Also, to prevent attacks across the zones, it is sometimes necessary 
to construct fences or other barriers and to patrol the area continuously. 
Finally, Figure 5 shows some types of sites that UN peacekeepers might be mandated to guard. 
This task necessarily involves intensive monitoring, sometimes over large areas. United Nations 
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Protected Areas (UNPAs), for instance, may be designated by the Security Council to cover a entire cities and surrounding regions. Other guarded sites in UN history have included - Strategic facilities (airports, train stations, bridges, cultural facilities) - Key sites under potential threat (Presidential residences, rebel headquarters) 
- Communications facilitiedroutes (radio stations, telephone and power line<) 
- Transport routes (roads, train tracks) 
- Other inhtructure (power-generating plants, mines) 
- Humanitarian sites (aid stations, refugees camps) 
- UN facilities (headquarters, camp). 
4 
The UN must be aware of the vulnerabilities of such sites to attack and sabotage, and be able to 
provide early warning of any encroachments or hostile acts. Here again, the UN would benefit 
h m  a range of equipment and technology. These include fences, especially those that are 
designed to signal when an attempt is made to breach them and the wide range of intruder 
detection technologies. 
Figure 5 Diagram showing the types of areas which might require protection: LIN camps, sa& areas, sirat@ 
locntions (such as airports) andrebel bases during a disarmamentped 
3.2. Analysis and Dissemination of In formation 
In addition to gathering information, the UN must also analyze and disseminate information 
appropriately. Here again technology has a key role to play. 
Information Analysis 
The analysis of data is important for several reasons. First, data from sensors must be made 
intelligible! Raw data often consists of a string of digital pulses that require computers analysis 
to produce images or other useful information. Patterns may need to be analyzed at various 
levels, from the basic identity of an imaged object to determining the potential strategy behind 
the movement of many weapons and combattants over time. Second, the operators and analysts 
must determine whether there are any technical difficulties with the system. By analyzing the 
signals, conducting quality checks and occasionally calibrating the system (if necessary), the 
operators can gain confidence in the accuracy of the signals, Furthermore, it may be necessary to 
utilize various methods of “authentication” to make sure that the signal is not being manipulated 
for hostile purposes, Often redundancy checks are made by verifying that two identical sensors 
respond the same way to the same stimuli. (These redundancy and authentication processes 
parallel, on the technical level, a standard UN practice of having two UN military observers from 
different nationalities both sign any reports of violations.) Thus, the UN will usually need to 
analyze information for a short period of time before sharing the results with the parties. 
Dissemination o f  Information 
When an armed conflict is in progress it is difficult to tell what is actually 
happening. Both sides put out their own versions of events, usually censored and 
sophisticated. If the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United 
Nations is to take appropriate action in a confused situation of conflict obviously 
it should have accurate and unbiased information. What is really going on? That 
is the question which the United Nations first of all wants answered when it sends 
military observers to Palestine, or anywhere else. Later, if either of the UN organs 
have made decisions or recommendations, it will want observers to tell it whether 
the parties are complying with them.” 
The view expressed by General E.L.M. Burns illustrates how monitoring in peacekeeping was 
traditionally done more to inform United Nations bodies in New York than to inform the parties 
in the field. The concept of cooperative monitoring shifts the emphasis to supplying the parties 
with information. In this way, cooperative monitoring serves as a confidence-building system as 
well as a verification one. The UN Secretary-General’s 1995 study on “Verification in All Its 
Aspects” highlights this approach: 
In crisis situations or in post-conflict contexts, the ability of all parties to have 
accurate, timely information so that threatening actions can be avoided, or early 
warning of impending danger, may be central to the successful resolution of the 
dispute . . . Because parties to a conflict, especially intra-State conflict, have little 
or no confidence in each other, verification and transparency take on special 
importance . . . The United Nations may, upon request, provide such monitoring 
Burns, p.277 (italics added). 
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and could assist the parties involved in their monitoring activities in other 
instances.I6 
When parties receive regular, systematic information about events in the field fiom objective 
sources, they generally feel more secure. It is also harder for hostile elements within the parties 
to introduce falsehoods and spread propaganda. What is important is that the parties receive 
regular information in a convincing fashion, preferably identical reports containing sufficient 
detail, from a body that has shown competence in catching even minor infractions of agreements. 
Just as there are degrees of cooperation in information gathering, so there are also a range of 
possibilities for data dissemination. On first blush, one might think that the ideal way to create 
complete transparency is by freely distributing all UN data to all the parties. The UN, however, 
rarely does this for several good reasons. A conflicting party could take advantage of certain 
information provided by the UN on the military disposition of the other party to help prepare for 
an attack or other aggressive acts. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the UN to provide 
equally significant data to both sides - and, besides, the UN would not want to be an unwitting 
accomplice to aggression. Also the UN would not want to reveal in too obvious a fashion any 
weaknesses in its information-gathering, should these exist. Furthermore, some of the UN's 
methods and local sources may need to remain unknown to the parties to prevent their hurting or 
tampering with them. 
Still, a good flow of information is a key ingredient in building confidence among conflicting 
parties. Thus, the UN has to judge, in each case, the best level of information sharing with the 
parties. Some options are presented in Table 5. In almost all cases, it should make sure that the 
sharing is done impartially, i.e., that both parties are treated according to the same rules. This 
means similar, but not necessarily identical, information is provided to both sides. In UN 
tradition, such sharing need not be done in the public gaze or in the presence of all parties; one 
side does not always need to know what the other side is getting. 
Table 5. Degrees of Information Dissemination 
All information is provided . . . to all parties 
Only violations, major or minor, are reported . . . 
- to all parties 
- to the offending party (as a protest) 
- with all supporting evidence (information essential 
- only with supporting evidence that will not affect 
- with no supporting evidence 
- on a real-time basis 
Violations are reported . . . 
to demonstrate non-compliance) 
military security of offending party 
Situation reports are provided . . . 
"Report of the Secretary-General on Verification In All Its Aspects, including the Role of the United 16 
Nations in the Field of Verification," UN Doc. A/50/377 of 22 September 1995, para. 18,39 and 277. 
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In cases where one party brings an allegation of a violation to the UN, the peacekeepers will try 
to investigate. The results (if not the report) of the investigation will be provided to the parties, 
especially if there is a Joint Commission or other dispute settlement forum to formally, though 
often confidentially, present such reports. Coming to firm decisions on violations, however, can 
also land the UN into trouble: parties may resent being accused of non-compliance. General 
Burns, who chaired the Mixed Armistice Commissions between Israel and the neighboring Arab 
states in 1955, had much experience in such matters. He found that parties would sometimes 
accuse UN officials, unjustly, of currying favor with the other side for personal reasons. Such 
allegations have often been made in UN  mission^.'^ Almost forty years later the UN Secretary- 
General was to write that the UN Operation in El Salvador “was operating in an atmosphere of 
deep distrust. Its insistence on maintaining its impartiality is sometimes misperceived by each 
side as being partiality towards the other.”18 When reconciliation between the parties is 
achieved, though, such criticism quickly fades away. 
In spite of some negative UN experiences in sharing information with conflicting parties, the 
arguments for an automatic and equal feed of some significant information is compelling. There 
are definite benefits to a monitoring system in which identical information is given automatically 
to each party. For one, the parties can less easily accuse the UN of playing favorites in its 
information dissemination. Such a cooperative monitoring system builds confidence because 
parties can see that violations are being detected and responded to; the parties are better able to 
judge the performance of each other. In addition, they can corroborate UN information with 
their own. Furthermore, they may be in a position to correct the UN when information is 
erroneous. In the end, the decision whether the UN should provide parties with a regular pipeline 
of identical information automatically will depend on the case. The situation on the ground, the 
psychology of parties, the danger of break out (resumed fighting) and, indeed, the quality of the 
UN’s information gathering system must all be taken into account. It would be valuable, 
however, to explore this new dimension of cooperative monitoring in future peace agreements. 
The ability to gather, analyze and disseminate useful information will depend in great part on the 
selection of appropriate technologies. 
3.3. Technology Selection Criteria 
In choosing which technologies to deploy to the field, there are legal, political and practical 
factors that the United Nations must take into account. Even the decision whether to use 
advanced technologies and the choice of specific technologies, as well as the method and 
location, will depend greatly on these considerations. 
0 
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Legal Aspects 
In order to use monitoring technologies in the field, the UN must overcome political and 
practical hurdles but legally there are relative few problems. There is no provision of 
international law prohibiting the UN from employing sensors in its field operations. There are, 
however, some legal “constraints,” as well as legally-guaranteed freedoms, that are stipulated in 
international legal documents (treaties and agreements) that have a bearing on monitoring and 
the stationing of devices to do it. To begin with, the United Nations Charter states, in Article 
2(7), that 
Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII. 
While some peacekeeping operations are mandated under Chapter VII,19 in which case the UN is 
legally permitted to over-ride the non-consent of a party, the vast majority of UN operations are 
deployed under conditions of consent of the host state. Once the UN has gained such overall 
consent for the deployment of a peacekeeping force and has a mandate to carry observation 
activities, there is no reason under international law why it cannot bring observation equipment 
to the field to fulfill its mandate. 
The 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, reinforces the Charter 
provision (Article 105) that the officials of the UN “shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Member such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their 
functions in connection with the Organization.” It could easily be argued that such “independent 
exercise” of peacekeeping duties includes the use of monitoring technologies. Decisions of the 
International Court of Justice, other treaties and extensive state practice support the provisions of 
the Convention.*’ 
Still, the UN usually seeks to negotiate a formal agreement with the parties to the conflict. This 
is wise because a written agreement can clarify many fine points, codify agreed behavior and 
provide written assurances to both sides. Also, only 120-odd member states of the UN, of which 
there are 191 in total, have signed the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. The UN seeks 
formal assurances from the parties to respect its rights during deployment, especially in case 
questions or difficulties arise in the future. The parties, often in a protective and suspicious frame 
l9 In such case, Chapter VI1 mandates are given to permit the UN operation to use force to achieve its 
mandate. Frequently, the expression “all necessary means” (or similar wording) is used in the Security 
Council resolution. Cases include: UNIKOM to prevent incursions across the Iraq-Kuwait border and 
UNOSOM for the protection of humanitarian supplies and the apprehension of war criminals in Somalia. 
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, Chapter VI1 was invoked (e.g., S/RES/807 of 19 February 1993 and 
several resolutions in June 1993) so that UNPROFOR could carry out certain tasks using force, e.g., the 
protection of “safe areas.” Similarly the Security Council authorized the NATO Implementation Force 
(IFOR) under Chapter VI1 (S/RES/103 1 of 15 December 1995). 
The International Court of Justice ruled in 1949 that “the rights and duties of an entity such as the 
[United Nations] must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent 
documents and developed in practice” [Reparation for Injuries Case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p.174 as quoted 
in Czamecki, Ralph, p.190. See also the “Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel” available at www.un.ora/law/cod/safety.htm, accessed 12 January 2004.1 
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of mind, similarly would like to have formal assurances that the UN will behave appropriately 
and not overstep its mandate. The agreement between the UN and the host state is called a Status 
of Forces [or Mission] Agreement, abbreviated SOFA or SOMA (henceforth SOFA is used to 
denote both). The UN has made public its model SOFA.21 While the UN’s model SOFA does 
not go into the detail on the types of equipment which may be brought in, it does include 
provisions for the UN’s unrestricted “freedom of movement,” the “right to unrestricted 
communication” within the territory of the host state and to the exchange of message traffic with 
the “United Nations global telecommunication network.” The SOFA usually quotes the mandate 
of the force as written in the Security Council resolution and/or the peace agreement. 
The SOFA also provides reassurance to the parties: “The United Nations peacekeeping operation 
and its members shall refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and 
international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of the present arrangement. The 
United Nations peacekeeping operation shall respect all local laws and regulations” (Article 6 ,  
emphasis added). Since local laws often include prohibitions on monitoring of military activities, 
a legal problem can potentially arise. Also conflicting powers may claim to be the legitimate 
legal authority in the area. The UN’s fulfillment of its mandate would, however, take precedence. 
The UN usually tries to gain the consent of all parties to the conflict in the territory where the 
UN is to located, though for legal reasons it needs only the consent of the host state. As well, the 
UN concludes agreements with the member states contributing personnel based on a draft model 
agreement.22 This is done for political as well as strictly legal reasons. 
Political Aspects 
Political and human factors make up the greatest challenge to technical innovation in 
peacekeeping. Firstly, at the UN, it is necessary to overcome the inexperience and general lack of 
awareness of monitoring technologies among diplomats and Secretariat staff. There is a natural 
tendency in human nature to mistrust something that has not yet been tried, or something that 
might fail unexpectedly. The solution is, of course, to gain experience. 
Among the parties, the mistrust would be of a different sort. They might fear that the UN could 
gain compromising information about them that could lead to a loss of security. They might fear 
that, under the guise of cooperative monitoring, UN could engage in a kind of “legalized 
spying.” Should sensitive political or military information pass to the other side, either through 
deliberate action or inadvertently, this might lead to political damage, or worse, loss on the 
battlefield. Furthermore, they might worry that the other side might be able to manipulate sensors 
to fool the UN. 
These types of fears among parties have arisen many times in past UN operations where UN 
personnel had selective access to military, political or other sites and information. The UN has 
dealt with these fears by reassuring the parties that it will act impartially and in strict accordance 
See “Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations” in UN Doc. A/45/594 of 8 
October 1990. 
An early version of the “Draft Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States 
contributing personnel and equipment to United Nations peacekeeping operations” is contained in UN 
Doc. A/46/185 and Corr. 1 (annex) of 3 June 1991. 
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with its mandate. Similarly, the UN can alleviate fears associated with the introduction of 
technology by providing such assurances backed by detailed explanations. It could, for instance, 
detail the type of information that will be sought and the general methods and devices that will 
be employed. Furthermore, it could provide the party with regular reports on its monitoring 
activities and results. 
Practical Aspects 
It is obvious that the equipment must work! This entails a host of considerations including 
procedures for operation, maintenance and repair. To operate the devices, training may be 
necessary, especially if the equipment is complicated. The UN has experienced a wide 
divergence of technological capacity between peacekeeping contingents, particularly between the 
developed and the developing world. An example from the UN operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
illustrates this. Swedish peacekeepers brought in night vision equipment (NVE) in the 1970s. 
They offered to share the technology with peacekeepers from a developing nation that had no 
experience with NVE. Sharing this equipment would permit more frequent and effective night 
patrols thereby enhancing mission success as well as the security of the Swedish contingent. The 
Swedes warned their African colleagues about the danger of exposing the NVE to direct 
sunlight. Being new to the technology, the untrained soldiers blinded the device by testing them 
in daylight on the first day. Modern NVE incorporates technology to prevent such damage but at 
the time there was a loss of tens of thousands of dollars. The lesson from this experience is not 
that technologies should not be shared, but rather that an international capacity is needed to train 
inexperienced contingents in the new technologies that are deployed, whether the equipment is 
UN-owned or borrowed from nations. Instead of creating a gap between national contingents, 
technology can be an equalizer of capabilities and a harmonizer over the various zones of 
reporting. 
The UN has procedures to compensate troop-contributing nations (TCNs) for equipment loans. It 
usually issues a “letter of assist” to these nations for equipment leases that can be either “wet or 
dry”, i.e., with servicing or not. The Standard Cost Manual for Peacekeeping Operations23 (1997) 
provides standard reimbursement rates per annum for observatiodoptical equipment as 10% and 
for communications equipment at 14.29 % of the market value of the equipment. It also gives 
reimbursement rates for the UN’s lease of thermal imaging systems (Ground Version) at $1,487 
(wet) and $1,058 (dry) per month for equipment whose generic market value is US$ 100,000. 
The aerial version is more expensive for the UN to lease: US$1,708 (wet) and US$1,270 (dry). 
Night observation devices (tripod mounted) are estimated to cost $12,000 or lease at a rate of 
$1301148 and maintenance rate of $130, not much more expensive than high-magnification 
binoculars (also tripod mounted) at $ 7,500 or monthly lease rate of $ 66/76 and monthly 
maintenance rate of $10. Over time technology usually gets both better and cheaper. 
According to the Manual on reimbursement. The estimated costs for purchase of other equipment 
are given in the manual as follows. 
Standard Cost Manual for Peacekeeping Operations, Revision 3 (1 997) and “Manual on Policies and 23 
Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop- 
Contributing Countries Participating in Peacekeeping Missions, Field Administration and Logistics 
Division, ”, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, 1997. 
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Table 6. Costs for Selected Items Listed in the "Standard Cost Manual for Peacekeeping Operations" 
(1 99 7) 
Selected Item 
Bar code reader 
Camera, Instant 
Fogging Machine 
Metal Detector, hand-held 
Metal Detector, walk-through 
Hedgehogs & Obstacles 
Watch Tower 
Mine Detector 
Sandbag 
Barrier, Bastion Wall 
Camera [Video] 
Camera, Betacam 
Radio Station Transmitter 
cost ($US) Comment 
1,000 1/01/95 
545 15/01/95 
850 0 1 /O 1/95 
200 
4,500 
170 
15,000 
2,500 
0.40 
120 
1,000 
75,000 
35,000 4 kilowatts 
Schiebel AN- 19/2 
Observation Equipment (Area Coverage) 
Binoculars 6,500 20 mag 120 dia 
200 handheld 7x50 
Infrared system 50,000 
Night Observation Device 3,000 
Thermal Imaging System 120,000 Aerial Version 
Thermal Imaging System 72,000 Ground Version 
Searchlight, handheld 200 
The manual also lists the basic amount paid to TCNs for each soldier: $988 (plus various 
allowances) per month, though specialists may earn the nation a supplementary pay of $291. 
Most nations pay their soldiers regular (national) salaries during missions. This means that 
peacekeeping is revenue generating for many developing nations and revenue loosing for others. 
Finances are a very important practical consideration for the UN, which has faced a continual 
budgetary crisis. For some equipment (such as commercial GPS or motion detectors), the costs 
are expected to be small (under $300 per device). But for some systems, additional factors must 
be included. In addition to the purchase or lease, the UN has to consider the costs for transport, 
set up, operation, maintenance, repair and storage. Specialized personnel, requiring additional 
salaries, may be needed to operate or train for some types of equipment. This important aspect 
deserves hrther study through detailed case studies. Such studies would look at specific 
scenarios, with defined UN monitoring mandates, and specific conditions, like the anticipated 
terrain and security threats. 
Terrain and Weather 
The type of terrain in the monitored area needs to be considered when designing the appropriate 
sensor system. The first factor to consider is the possible range of observation, given the terrain. 
In flat areas where the line of sight is long, such as in desserts, open fields, water bodies (lakes, 
rivers and oceans), long-range sensors can be used. These sensors include radar, cameras (still 
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and video, with zoom capability), and laser range-finders. In terrain typified by a short line of 
sight and many obstacles, as found in jungles, rapidly undulating areas and built-up urban 
regions, one might have to use numerous short-range sensors, spaced periodically, to cover the 
desired area. Such devices typically include seismic, acoustic, magnetic and infrared breakbeam 
sensors. Radar has poor penetration in jungle foliage, but nevertheless some short-range signals 
can be obtained. Mountainous or hilly terrain gives a line of sight that can be both long and short 
- long from high lookouts and short in narrow passes - so neither long- nor short-range sensor 
type is usually sufficient on its own. The combination of the two, however, can be excellent. 
Overhead reconnaissance using aircraft can be extremely useful because vast tracts of terrain, 
including mountainous and difficult to navigate territory, can be surveyed at comparatively great 
speed and ease from above. Helicopters, while generally slower and smaller, with less space for 
equipment are particularly useful because they permit hovering and landings on small plots of 
land so that reconnaissance on foot can be permitted. 
Terrain can impose other limitations on the choice of sensors. In the open dessert where there 
are many if not an infinite number of possible paths through the sand, point sensors are of limited 
value since they measure signals at one small location only. Also seismic devices are rendered 
ineffectual in the dessert because seismic waves are quickly absorbed by the sand. Similarly, in 
difficult mountainous terrain where vehicles are unlikely to pass, buried magnetic sensors are of 
limited value. Devices which require substantial power (e.g., X-ray machines) that cannot be 
battery or solar powered will be difficult to operate far from an electric grid, though diesel 
powered electric generators (frequently brought on peacekeeping missions) may in some cases 
be sufficient (though they are noisy). It is often necessary to bring an uninterruptible power 
supply (UPS) to conflict areas where electrical power frequently fails, especially if sensitive 
devices like computers are being operated (for example, to avoid data loss). 
Weather conditions also play a role in the choice of sensors. Cameras operating in the visible 
part of the electromagnetic spectrum can become virtually useless in heavy fog or rain. Similarly, 
image intensifiers work better at night when there is more ambient light, for instance, from a full 
moon on a cloudless night. Infrared devices work better when the targets (warm bodies) are at a 
greater temperature difference from the background (e.g., in colder weather). Acoustic sensors 
have more difficulty distinguishing target sounds from loud noise caused by thunder, rain or 
even wind. One of the great benefits of radar is that it works in almost all weather conditions. 
Even if the sensors can overcome adverse weather conditions, one must also consider the effects 
on the sensor units’ housing and any telemetry (radio signal) equipment associated with them. 
For instance, casings should not become deformed in very hot weather or cracked in very cold 
weather. Other criteria for technology selection include false alarm rates and 
response/assessment times, as well as other factors suggested in a previous CMC study: 
affordability, simplicity, durability, reliability and validity.24 
Salerno, Reynolds M., Randall R. Parish, Michael G. Vannoni and David S. Barber, “Peace Operations: 
The Potential Role of Monitoring Technologies”, Sandia Report, SAND2000-2947, Sandia National 
Laboratories, NM, 2000. 
24 
36 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
’e 
e 
’e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
0 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
- e  
0 
- e  
e 
e 
e 
a 
a 
4. Conclusions 
There can be no “technological fix” to the problem of peace in our troubled world. The 
individual human being, whether patrolling as a peacekeeper in a demilitarized zone or sitting as 
a mediator at a negotiating table, will always be the most important element. Monitoring 
technologies, however, can make such UN personnel more vigilant, more productive and much 
safer. Technologies can multiply the monitoring capacity of a peace operation in many ways, 
such as extending the range of the patrols and the areas covered, and providing quantifiable and 
usually accurate information. 
Technology becomes especially important when the UN presence is more than just symbolic, 
when the UN must fill its mandates with competence and completeness. Monitoring technologies 
also grow in importance when peacekeepers find themselves in dangerous areas, where 
situational awareness is vital for mission safety as well as mission success. In cases where the 
parties are able to pull many “tricks” on the UN - either through advanced technologies, simple 
ingenuity or sheers numbers - the UN can benefit from a technological edge. Finally, when the 
mandate is broad or the field of observation is large, technology can be an indispensable aid. 
This having been said, there are a number of potential problems that can arise with technologies, 
as mentioned above. Some technologies are vulnerable to countermeasures (for example, some 
night vision devices can be blinded and GPS is susceptible to jamming). Some technologies may 
prove unreliable, especially in adverse weather conditions (for example, photoreconnaissance in 
a snow storm), but this does not mean that tried and true technologies should not gradually 
become a standard part of UN peace operations, or that technological innovation should not be 
constantly pursued. 
At this formative stage, it would be valuable for the United Nations to develop its own in-house 
expertise and to learn from its experiences. There is at present no staff to study and explore 
technology use in the field, let alone to handle advanced technologies (except for 
communications technology). The institutional memory is slight, the ability to train new 
peacekeepers in technology use is nonexistent, and the capacity for innovation and growth is far 
from ideal. 
It is now vitally important that the UN, if it is to move along the path of technological literacy 
and improved effectiveness in the field, gain more awareness of the possibilities and limitations 
of technologies. Even if peacekeepers do not find themselves using all the available technologies 
in the field, they must know about such capabilities because they are frequently used by 
conflicting parties and by organizations with which the UN frequently cooperates (e.g., NATO). 
Technology goes hand in hand with the emerging concept of cooperative monitoring, as 
pioneered by the Cooperative Monitoring Center. Cooperative monitoring technologies have 
much to offer the further development of UN peacekeeping. Though monitoring has been a 
standard feature of UN peacekeeping since the first operation, the new emphasis on sharing 
information with parties in a regular and systematic fashion using modern technologies merits 
further attention and practical application. Many parties in current and future UN operations will 
appreciate the technical and objective nature of sensor information. Furthermore, technology 
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offers the potential for rapid communication of information (including to UN headquarters) and 
with a wide range of analytical outputs (e.g., graphs, statistical analysis, etc). 
With a host of new types of activities to monitor, kom elections to disarmament to sanctions, the 
United Nations needs to broaden its technology base and explore new monitoring procedures. 
While cooperative technical monitoring is only one component of a UN operation, it can make a 
considerable difference for the better. Technologies in the service of the United Nations would 
help the organization to become more effective in its field operations and thus help to move the 
world towards greater peace and security. 
. : 
Figure 6. Cooperative monitoring Zy the m, aided by technology, can foster 
' :  1 durable peace agreements. 
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Appendix A: UN Peacekeeping Operations: Four Categories 
MINURSO Western Sahara Observe cease-fire and confinement 690 (1991) 1991- 
of Moroccan trooDs and. later 
1. Observation Missions 
2. Interpositional Forces 
3. Multidimensional Operations 
4. Transitional Administrations 
Western Sahara 
UN Advance 
Mission in 
Cambodia 
UN Observer 
Mission in Georgia 
UN Observer 
Mission Uganda- 
Rwanda 
Mission in Liberia 
UN Observer 
UN Observer 
Mission in El 
Salvador 
1. Observation Missions 
Polisario forces 
establishment of UNTAC; provide 
mine-awareness training to civilians 
Abkhazian and Georgian forces as 
well as Russian military contingents 
UNAMIC Cambodia Supervise cease-fire prior to 717 (1991) 1991-92 
UNOMIG Georgia (Abkhazia) Observe cease-fire; monitor 849 (1 993) 1993- 
UNOMUR Uganda-Rwanda Monitor border to verify no passage 846 (1993) 1993-1 994 
Border of military aid 
UNOMIL Liberia Work with ECOMOG' for 866 (1 983) 1993-1997 
implementation of Cotonou Peace 
Agreement 
El Salvador and FMLN', 
humanitarian concerns 
ONUSAL El Salvador Monitor agreements between Gov. of 893 (1991) 1991-95 
Observation 
breaches of cease-fire 
from Afghanistan; investigate and 
II 
Later Suez Canal area, Golan Heights, Beirut and the Sinai 
Economic Community Military Observer Group: A separate peacekeeping force composed of 4,000 troops from 
1 
* Cease-fire line (CFL) later became the "Line of Control" 
Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria and Sierra Leone. 
3 
A- 1 
Observer Group 
Observers in 
1038 (1 996) 
1101 (1996) 
1118 (1997) 
1291 (2000) 
UN Mission of 
Observers in 
Previaka 
UN Verification 
Mission in 
Guatemala 
UN Observer 
Mission in Angola 
UN Mission in the 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
1996-2002 
1997- 
1997-99 
2000- 
UNASOG 
UNMOT 
UNMOP 
MINUGUA 
Initial Monitoring Tasks 
Secure cease-fire and removal of 
foreign (France, Israel, UK) forces from 
Egypt; serve as buffer between Israeli 
and Egyptian forces 
Maintain cease-fire zones and 
encourage normal civilian activity in 
"buffer zone" 
Supervise ceasefire after Yom Kippur 
War and later 1974 and 1975 
Egyptianllsraeli agreements; deploy 
troops to buffer zone 
Maintain cease-fire between Israel and 
Syria; supervise disengagement of 
forces and areas of limitation and 
separation 
Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from S. Lebanon; assist Lebanese Gov. 
in return of its authority 
Monitor Khawr Abd Allah waterway, 
DMZ along border; observe any hostile 
acts; later, act as an interpositional 
force to deter border violations 
Replaced UNPROFOR in Macedonia, 
keeping same mandate: monitor border 
area for events that could undermine 
stability in Macedonia; act as "trip-wire'' 
Monitor cessation of hostilities and 
temporary security zone; assist in 
ensuring observance of security 
commitments agreed by parties 
MONUA 
MONUC 
Initial Security 
Council Res. 
(General 
Assembly Res.) 
186 (1964) 
GA 998 (ES-1) 
340 (1973) 
350 (1974) 
425 (1978) 
687 (1991) 
983 (1995) 
1320 (2000) 
Republic of Chad 
Tajikistan 
Prevlaka, 
peninsula, Croatia 
Guatemala 
Angola 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
2. Interpositional Peacekeeping Forces 
Name 
UN Emergency 
Force 
UN Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus 
UN Emergency 
Force II 
UN Disengagement 
Observer Force 
UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon 
UN Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation 
Mission 
UN Preventive 
Deployment Force 
UN Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
Acronym 
UNEF I 
UNFICYP 
UNEF I1 
UNDOF 
UNlFlL 
UNIKOM 
UNPREDEP 
UNMEE 
Main 
Location(s) 
Sinai Peninsula 
and Gaza Strip 
Nicosia 
Sinai Peninsula 
and Suez Canal 
Syrian Golan 
Heights 
Southern Lebanon 
Iraq/Kuwait Border 
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
Ethiopia, Eritrea 
Verify withdrawal of Libyan 
administration and forces from 
Aouzou Strip 
Monitor cease-fire on Tajik-Afgan 
border; investigate cease-fire 
violations and report them to UN 
Monitor demilitarization of Pelvlaka 
Peninsula 
Verify fulfillment of cease-fire 
provisions of Dec. 1996 Peace 
Accords; later verify disarmament, 
human rights and other tasks 
Assist in consolidating peace and 
national reconciliation, enhance 
democratic development 
Monitor cease-fire; facilitate 
disengagement; maintain liaison with 
parties and carry out humanitarian and 
other tasks 
915 (1994) 7 
Year@) 
1956-67 
1964- 
1973-79 
1974- 
1978- 
1991- 
1995-99 
2ooo- 
Frente Farabunddo Marti para la Liberacien Nacional (FMLN): A liberation group in opposition with the El 2 
Salvador Government. 
A- 2 
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3. Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations 
Name 
UN Operation in the 
Congo 
UN Transition 
Assistance Group 
UN Protection 
Force - later UN 
Peace Force, UN 
Confidence 
Restoration 
Operation & 
UNPROFOR 
UN Transitional 
Authority in 
Cambodia 
UN Operation in 
Somalia I 
UN Operation in 
Somalia II 
UN Operation in 
Mozambique 
UN Mission in Haiti 
UN Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda 
UN Angola 
Verification Mission 
1 1 1  
UN Confidence 
Restoration 
Organization in 
Croatia 
UN Mission in 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
UN Support Mission 
In Haiti 
UN Transition 
Mission in Haiti 
JN Civilian Police 
Mission in Haiti 
JN Mission in the 
Zentral African 
3epublic 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a * 
a 
a’ 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
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a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
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a 
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Acronym 
ONUC 
UNTAG 
UNPROFOR - 
later UNPF, 
UNCRO, 
UNPROFOR 
UNTAC 
UNOSOM I 
UNOSOM I1 
ONUMOZ 
UNMIH 
UNAMIR 
UNAVEM 111 
UNCRO 
UNMIBH 
UNSMIH 
UNTMIH 
MIPONUH 
MINURCA 
Main 
Location(s) 
R.O. Congo (Zaire) 
Namibia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Federal 
Rep. of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and 
Montenegro), 
former Yugoslav 
Rep. of Macedonia 
Cam bod ia 
Somalia 
Somalia 
Mozambique 
Haiti 
Rwanda 
Angola 
Croatia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Haiti 
Haiti 
Haiti 
Central African 
Republic 
Initial Mandate 
Ensure withdrawal of Belgian forces; 
assist Gov. with law and order; secure 
removal of all foreign and mercenary 
personnel 
SuDervise transition of Namibia from 
Sohh African rule to independence 
Create a secure environment for 
negotiation of overall settlement to 
Yugoslav crisis; ensure demilitarization 
of UNPAs4 by conflicting parties 
Ensure 1991 peace agreementsJ, 
including fair elections, keeping law and 
order, humanitarian concerns 
Monitor cease-fire; later worked with 
UNITAF for humanitarian assistance, 
secure population centres 
Establish a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia 
Monitor cease-fire and withdrawal of 
foreign forces, also elections and 
humanitarian concern 
Establish new police force; monitor 
Haitian Police: rebuild communitv and 
civilian conceins 
Ensure cease-fire zone; assist with 
mine clearance, election preparation, 
and humanitarian concerns 
Assist in establishing peace and 
national reconciliation 
Replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia; 
facilitate humanitarian assistance 
through Croatia, monitor demilitarization 
of Previaka Peninsula 
Assist with law enforcement activities 
and police reform; coordinate UN 
activities for humanitarian relief & 
refugees, demining, human rights, 
elections and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure and economic 
reconstruction. Established IPTF’ and a 
UN civilian office to help uphold 1995 
Dayton Peace Accords 
Help maintain secure and stable 
environment; assist with establishment 
&training of national police force; 
support economic rehabilitation 
Assist in professionalization of Haitian 
National Police; promote economic 
rehab. 
Oversee technical assistance to Haitian 
National Police, funded by UNDP‘ 
Promote national reconciliation, security 
and safety of country; provide advice in 
development of police program and 
elections 
Initial Security 
Council 
Resolution 
143 (1960) 
435 (1 978) 
743 (1 992) 
745 (1 992) 
751 (1992) 
814 (1993) 
782 (1 992) 
867 (1 993) 
872 (1993) 
976 (1 995) 
981 (1995) 
1035 (1 995) 
1053 (1996) 
1123 (1997) 
1141 (1997) 
1159 (1996) 
Year@) 
1960-64 
1989-90 
1992-95 
1992-93 
1992-93 
1993-95 
1992-94 
1993-96 
1993-96 
1995-97 
1995-96 
1995- 
2002 
1996-97 
1997 
1997- 
2000 
1998- 
2000 
UN Protected Areas: Areas containing a high Serb population and are therefore under close UN supervision. The 
Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict granted full governing power of 
International Police Task Force is a group created for civilian protection. 
United Nations Development Programme 
4 
three UNPAs are: Eastern Slovania, Western Slovenia and Cambodia. 
Cambodia to the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. 
3 
A- 3 
UN Civilian Police 
Support Group 
UN Mission in 
4. Transitional Administrations 
UNPSG Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja and 
Western Sirmium 
(Croatia) 
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone 
region; ensure safe return of displaced 
people 
Cooperate with Government and other 
parties in implementing Lome Peace 
Agreement; assist with disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of ex- 
combatants 
Promote national reconciliation; various 
peacebuilding tasks entrusted to UN in 
Bonn Agreement, incl. human rights, 
rule of law and gender issues; 
managing all UN humanitarian, relief, 
recovery and reconstruction activities 
Provide assistance to East Timor as 
operational responsibilities are fully 
devolved to East Timor authorities 
. .  
Guinea (West Irian) I 
UN Transitional I UNTAES I Eastern Slavonia, 
1270 (1999) 
1401 (2002) 
1410 (2002) 
UN Assistance 
Mission in 
UNAMA Afghanistan 
I I 
UN Mission of 
Support in East 
Timor 
Monitor Croatian police in Danube I 1145(1997) 
UNMISET East Timor (Timor 
Leste) 
Name 
UN Temporary 
Executive 
Authority 
Functions Acronym Location 
UNTEA West New Guinea 
(West Papua), 
currently part of 
For 6 months, accept governance of 
territory from Netherlands before 
turning it over to Indonesia. Act with 
full authority to administer territory, to 
maintain law and order, to protect 
rights of inhabitants and ensure 
uninterrupted, normal services 
Security arm of UNTEA; maintain 
law and order; monitor cease-fire 
I 
UN Security Force UNSF 
in West New 
area 
Govern region for 12 months; 
maintain security; facilitate 
demilitarization; ensure safe return of 
refuaees and imolementation of 
Indonesia 
West New Guinea 
(West PaDua) 
Bask Agreemeit, organize elections 
Administer (govern) territory of 
Administration for 
Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja and 
Western Sirmium 
UN Interim 
Administration in 
Kosovo 
Kosovo; wide-ranging tasks, such as 
overseeing health and education, 
banking and finance, post and 
telecommunications, and law and 
order; organize elections 
Administer the Territory, exercise 
legislative and executive authority 
during transition period and support 
capacity-building for self-government 
Baranja and 
Western Sirmium 
UNMIK Fed. Rep. 
Yugoslavia 
(Kosovo) 
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UN Transitional 
Administration in 
East Timor 
2002- 
UNTAET East Timor 
GA 1752 (XVII) 1962-63 
(General Assembly 
Resolution) 
(General Assemblv 
1244 (1 999) 1999- 
1272 (1 999) 1999- 
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